ABSTRACT

Marxism has defined its key values in opposition to animals other than human in order to promote the interests of the most downtrodden human beings. Although it has characterized itself as a scientific historical and economic theory, sympathy for human suffering has provided its most powerful motivation as a political force. This capacity for sympathy, causing in modern times an extension of Marxist concerns beyond “class” in the original sense, is beginning to accommodate animals as are the theoretical concepts of alienation, surplus value, and historical materialism. Marxism’s inconsistencies are being resolved in favor of the side that, for human as well as animal benefit, favors individual sentence and other pro-animal values. So, in a truly dialectical progression, the same quality of sympathy that at first caused Marxism to denigrate animals is now coming out in their support.

Marxism defines its key values in opposition to animals other than human in order to uphold the lowest common denominator of the human within European culture. Rejecting mere humanitarianism, it does so through an analysis of history, society, and economics. But concern for human well-being has been the motor of socialism as a political movement, with Marxist theory providing more impressive intellectual fuel than was formerly available. I am considering Marxism as including this broader movement.
Apart from the possibility of extending sympathy to animals, theoretical features of Marxism are applicable to them as are some Marxist inconsistencies that can be aligned with “animal” and “anti-animal” values. Gradual recognition of the need for the “animal” side to prevail, for the sake of human beings as well, has been accompanied by an extension of concern to actual animals; both developments springing from the sentient animal within each human socialist. This concern is overcoming resistance to the inclusion of animals on the agenda, a resistance that traditionally has been so strong that the more tears Marxists shed for the child laborer, the more indignation they feel at any shed for the veal calf.

The progression from exclusion to inclusion conforms to Engels’ (Parsons, 1977) account of the dialectic in which “the two poles of an antithesis . . . are just as inseparable from each other as they are opposed”. (pp. 4-5)

In tracing this progression, I offer a concept of Marxism that locates in the animal dimension an emphasis on the sympathetic moral “ought” of Marxism rather than the historical-materialist “is.” Recent breakthroughs make the eventual full endorsement of animal rights by socialists seem likely.

**Marxism’s Values Constructed Against the Animal**

The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling species (variant of Marx & Engels, 1968, p. 37). In this respect, Marxist ideas served humanitarian purposes after a typical Enlightenment pattern, whereby, as observed by Singer (1976), “it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of the dignity of all human beings. We admit that we ourselves are . . . on a par with the poorest, most ignorant members of our own species” (p. 159). That speciesism offers a moral ground floor for the lowliest humans is illustrated by Marx’s comment that the slave,

> takes care to let both beast and implement feel that he is none of them, but
> is a man. He convinces himself . . . that he is a different being, by treating
> the one unmercifully and damaging the other con amore [italics added] (Marx,

The behavior of the slave parallels the ideological violence done to animals by Marxism on behalf of oppressed human beings. Benton (1993) has noted how in the Paris manuscripts,
central organizing concepts—species-being and estrangement—are developed by Marx in terms of a fundamental opposition between human and animal nature. . . . In effect, capitalist private property stands condemned for its tendency to reduce humans to the condition of animals. (p. 23)

Dualism requires not just opposition but mutually exclusive definition. Marx (1970) writes: “We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labor that remind us of the mere animal. We pre-suppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human” (pp. 177, 178). Other examples include the following:

1. socialized labor: “It is only after men have raised themselves above the rank of animals, when therefore their labor has been . . . socialised, that . . . the surplus-labor of the one becomes a condition of existence for the other.” (Marx, quoted in Parsons, 1977, p. 124)

2. organization (in socialist society): “The struggle for individual existence comes to an end. And at this point, . . . man finally . . . leaves the conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human.” (Engels, quoted in Parsons, 1977, p. 141)

3. species-being: Animals are not mentioned, but their status as negative foil is implicit in the concept, “In his consciousness of species man confirms his real social life and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species-consciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being.” (Marx, quoted in Parsons, 1977, pp. 212, 213)

4. earthly paradise: “the idea of solidarity could finally . . . grow to a point where it will embrace all mankind and oppose it, as a society of brothers living in solidarity, to the rest of the world – the world of minerals, plants, and animals.” (Engels, quoted in Parsons, 1977, p. 144)

The Importance of Sympathy in Marxism

“Man is . . . an active natural being. . . . On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants” (Marx, quoted in Benton, 1993, p. 45). More than one-third of Volume I of Capital (Marx, 1970) contains references to or, more often, lengthy descriptions of the suffering of the proletariat, especially of children. Volumes II (Marx, 1961) and III (Marx, 1962) consist mostly
of economic analysis, but that analysis builds on the principle that capitalism extracts real life from the worker to create surplus value for the capitalist.

**Theoretical Features of Marxism that Can Be Applied to Animals**

*The Working Class*

Marx’s indignation at Adam Smith’s association of human and animal labor forms part of his economic argument:

> To what extent Adam Smith has blocked his own way to an understanding of the role of labour-power in the process of self-expansion of value is proven by the following sentence, which . . . places the labour of labourers on a level with that of labouring cattle. “Not only his (the farmer’s) labouring servants, but his labouring cattle are productive labourers.” (Marx, 1961, p. 214n)

But animals, working or not, do constitute a class. Kept animals, like the human proletariat, were reduced to their status through dispossession, not only of autonomy within their own habitat but even of their genetic makeup? animals and plants being “in their present form . . . the result of a gradual transformation . . . under man’s superintendence, and by means of his labour” (Marx, 1970, p. 181). Noske (1989) drew “parallels between the oppression of workers by the capitalist system and the use of animals in agribusiness” (Garner, 1993, p. 213). Benton (1993, p. 59) also associates class with factory farming.

Modern Marxists have effectively applied the idea of “class” to any mistreated group of human beings with whom socialists should be concerned, although an effort sometimes is made to link the oppression to traditional class issues. This development would seem to offer, as Garner (1993) suggests, “scope for socialists to regard animals as an exploited group, along with the poor, gays and ethnic minorities”. (p. 200)

Charlton, Coe and Francione (1993) apply alienation and (by implication) species-being applied to animals, writing that “in a capitalist system” animals
are “alienated from many of the actions that their bodies would perform, alienated from other animals, and alienated from natural surroundings” (p. 30). Noske (1997), applies the four Marxian types of alienation to animals: (a) from the product, “animals are made to have as many young as possible, which are taken away from them almost immediately after birth” (p. 18); (b) from productive activity, since the “one bodily ‘skill’” (such as fattening) “which the animal is forced to specialize in, implies the extracting of one single part from the totality which is the animal” (p. 19); (c) from fellow-animals, since “[c]apitalist industrial production has either removed the animals from their own societies or has grossly distorted these societies by crowding the animals” (p. 19); and (d) in total, “alienation from species life”. (p. 20)

**Surplus Value**

Adam Smith, in the analysis derided by Marx, writes that both the laborers and laboring cattle “not only occasion . . . the reproduction of a value equal to their own consumption, or to the capital which employs them, together with its owners’ profits; but of a much greater value” (Marx, 1961, p. 301). Besides their work, animals must give their lives for food. The observation that “[i]n capitalist society spare time is acquired for one class by converting the whole life-time of the masses into labor-time” (Marx, 1970, p. 530) applies even more to them. “The modern animal industry does not allow them to ‘go home’—they are exploited 24 hours a day” (Noske, 1997, p. 17). The animal yields surplus value in that one party gains from the other more than it gives but takes credit for sustaining the exploited one.

**Historical Materialism**

“While the materialist conception of history is a vast improvement over pre-Marxist idealistic views, ‘hismat’ . . . makes too little room for nature’s economy and too much for human economy” (O’Connor, 1998, p. 4). From a feminist perspective, Mellor (1996) asks, “Why should the means of survival (a biological imperative) be allowed into historical materialism but not the means of reproducing life itself?” (p. 256). An animal-conscious historical materialism would include the productive, reproductive, and appropriative needs and activities of all beings throughout evolution.
Marxist Inconsistencies Aligned with “Animal” and “Anti-Animal” Values

Benton (1993) recognizes that “Marx’s texts are riven by internal contradictions” (p. 35) or in some cases, one might say, simply ambivalences. In Marxian materialism, “while attention is drawn to human-animal continuity, Marxists are even more in the habit of stressing human-animal discontinuity” (Noske, 1997, p. 73). Engels sees human beings both as “belong[ing] to nature” and as “mastering it”. (Benton, 1996, p. 176)

A second inconsistency concerns the issue of power. The projected triumph of the working class implies a might-makes-right ethos (an anti-animal value, in the context of human-animal relations) that conflicts with Marxian sympathy for the downtrodden (a potentially pro-animal value).

In a related ambivalence, that metanarrative invokes the “is” of historical and economic laws but accompanies the invocation with the unmistakable “ought” of Marx’s rhetoric. “Though [Marx and Engels] often spoke as if the future transition to socialism and communism were a scientifically predictable certainty, this was a ‘fact’ they undeniably . . . welcomed as an immense moral advance in civilization”. (Benton, 1993, p. 100)

Marx’s admiration for industrialism is modified by his awareness of how it “converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity” (Marx, 1970, p. 360) and of how “constant labour of one uniform kind disturbs the intensity and flow of a man’s animal spirits” (p. 341). But, believing industrialism to be possible without exploitation, he would not have wanted to return to the freer way of life of the artisan, still less that of the hunter-gatherer: “The primitive forester . . . uses the primitive forest as his property with the freedom of an orang outang” (p. 614n). One can see in this preference an alignment of industrialism with the use of domesticated animals and lack of (human or animal) freedom as against freer modes of production, “wild” animals, and (human or animal) autonomy.

Collectivism versus individualism forms another dichotomy. Political collectivism may be seen in Marx’s “contempt for the ‘rights of man,’” which “derives from an over-socialized and over-politicized view of human nature” (Benton, 1993, p. 193). On the deeper level of human identity, Marx, like mod-
ern communitarians, attacks as a form of alienation the very concept of the individual: “[E]stranged labour estranges the species from man. It changes for him the life of the species into a means of individual life”. (Benton, p. 27) But his rejection of liberal values also derives from the association of “rights” and “freedom” with capitalism and thus is consistent with respect for the individual worker. Despite such statements as “man first sees and recognises himself in other men” (Marx, 1970, p. 52n), the society Marxism aims at must be advanced as something that will make people happy; only an individual consciousness, however closely bound up with society, can be happy. So Marx protests that under capitalism “the social . . . organisation of labour-processes is turned into an organised mode of crushing out the workman’s individual vitality, freedom, and independence” (p. 506). Benton (1993) too, who endorses the concept of human beings as “ecologically and socially embedded” (p. 103), at the same time insists that “assigning moral priority to the well-being of individuals is . . . shared with the socialist critique of liberal rights theory, at least in the version I am here prepared to defend” (p. 101). Although the social view thus potentially is compatible with the individualist view, they form a dichotomy because of the history of state-socialism in which the individuals with their sentient needs were crushed in the supposed interest of the abstract, non-sentient collective. The collectivist view of animals sees them only as species, whose numbers are to be regulated for human benefit, rather than as individuals whose own welfare matters.

Twentieth-century Developments

Orwell (1977) and Bahro (1986) in different ways have moved toward the “animal” side of Marxism. Orwell’s great contribution was his promotion of a libertarian and egalitarian, rather than collectivist and bureaucratic socialism. Regarding animals, he had the typically compartmentalized attitudes of his culture, accepting its exploitative practices—he shot and fished and despised vegetarianism—but being notably kind to, and fond of, household pets and able to describe animal suffering movingly. In his 1947 preface to Animal Farm, Orwell displayed his Marxist orientation in the atypical brief glimpse of animals as a class that provided the genesis of the book:

I thought of exposing the Soviet myth in a story that could be easily understood . . . However the actual details did not come to me . . . until one day . . .
I saw a little boy . . . driving a huge cart-horse along a narrow path, whipping it whenever it tried to turn. It struck me that if only such animals became aware of their strength we should have no power over them, and that men exploit animals in much the same way as the rich exploit the proletariat. (Crick, 1992, pp. 450-451)

Orwell (1977) immortalized the horse as Boxer, a figure identifying the working animal with the human working class. His betrayal and murder (pp. 104-107) provide the final condemnation of Stalinism from a Marxist standpoint. The story’s attack on hierarchical principles justifies Singer’s (1976) use of the phrase “All animals are equal” as the title of an article.

Bahro (1986), a Marxist turned environmentalist and New Leftist, rejected the Marxist worship of industrialism and explicitly supported animals, leaving the German Green Party primarily over its refusal to condemn animal experiments. Using Toynbee’s notion of the “external proletariat”, he expanded the notion of “class” to assert that capitalism “is running up against barriers: external nature; external proletariat, i.e., the population of the Third World apart from the elites; internal proletariat, i.e., the population of the developed countries outside the power structure” (p. 77). His opposition to vivisection was a mixture of sentient concern, anti-industrialism, and a “fundis” rather than “realo” stance. “[O]ur concern is with two key points which expose the nerve of our scientific-industrial barbarism: factory farming and animal experiments” (Bahro, p. 196). Whereas for Marx the animal protection societies, even more than their human-welfare counterparts, represented trivial bourgeois reformism, for Bahro animal experiments became a “litmus paper” (p. 209) with which to test revolutionary sincerity.

Another influence on modern, especially green, Marxism has been the outlook of indigenous peoples. Colonialism, after all, was an assault by Enlightenment-Christian industrial people upon non-industrial people whose worldview was connected centrally and favorably to their relation with nature. Although the hunter-gatherer economies of many indigenous people obviously are not vegetarian and their religious respect for animals not the same as a political animal rights outlook, their influence has inclined Western Marxists away from anthropocentrism.
Antagonism and Neglect

Parsons (1977, p. 47) offers the sort of anti-animal-rights arguments that long have prevailed on the Left. Animal rights is presented as a middle-class cause supported by rich people. See Morton (1992, p. 37), for counter-evidence from Shelley’s time and Senior (2000) on Jacobins freeing caged animals. In 1907, workers objected to using animals in experiments because it was not difficult for them “to see those animals as images of themselves.” On the grounds that the few must suffer for the many, the working class and unemployed were used as “experimental subjects” without consent. (Charlton et al., 1993, p. 30)

Today, according to Rollin (1990), “in Britain at least, many of the most militant advocates of animal rights are working-class people”. (p. 170)

Still, Parsons (1977) tells us that the animal cause is a “displacement of energy from the radical transformations demanded in society” (p. 47) and that it is endorsed by Nazis, some of whom “were fond of animals and believed in the conservation of nature” (p. 47). Parsons neglects to mention that Hitler was a vegetarian, but I suppose if even being fond of animals is enough to make one a Nazi, that would amply cover the vegetarian case. There is, of course, dispute over the extent of and, if factual, the motive for Hitler’s vegetarianism. Schwartz (1992, p. 242) is skeptical on both points, further noting Hitler’s ban on vegetarian organizations. Arluke and Sax (1992), however, report that Hitler “would not touch meat” (p. 17), which he associated with the decay of civilization. They also make clear that the Nazi, including Hitler’s, assortment of beliefs and policies did contain some genuine compassion for animals. One might ask: Why let the devil have this particular good tune?

Another popular argument is that animals cannot speak or act for themselves, the Marxist dimension found in the context of revolutionary struggle. Mills and Williams’ (1986, p. 31) response was to call for “a certain redefining of the political” to accommodate animals, who traditionally were “not to be regarded as constituent members of the state” Apart from the vulnerability of the “speak-for-themselves” argument to that from marginal human cases, it is untrue. Animals do speak and act for themselves: They cry, they struggle and try to escape, they stare in mute appeal from between the slats of lorries; whales sometimes attack whaling ships (Noske, 1997, p. 153). The
difference between their protests and human ones is that theirs are mostly ineffective against our power. The “speak-for-themselves” argument is really one of might-makes-right, which Marxists would reject in a human setting. As suggested earlier, however, might-makes-right is implied by the meta-narrative of the triumph of the proletariat.

Among some green Marxists, by contrast with Bahro (1986), animals are grossly neglected. In O’Connor’s (1998, pp. 267-339) ecosocialist program, not one of the lists of cause groups, ecoharms, and solutions, includes any consideration of animal welfare. To read such writers, you might think that the planet was occupied overwhelmingly by human, vegetable, and mineral forms with only the occasional (endangered or polluted) animal poking a nose through the shrubbery. But since our treatment of animals is, unfortunately, the most determinant factor in their environment, those who ignore their perspective are misusing the term “environment.”

Possible Marxist Grounds for Duties to Animals

Relationship

Benton (1993) favors a relational-continuum approach to animals, as distinct from a “rights” view. He argues that “rights” claims are vulnerable to counter-claims of human rights, for example, regarding animal experiments (p. 151). The “rights” concept seems to me simply an expression of policy preference, “rights” lacking any ontological status except (here concurring with Bentham) when written into law. However, the “socialist argument’s emphasis on the social-relational conditions and contexts under which formal rights may or may not be substantively enjoyed” (Benton, p. 151) contains the same vulnerability to human claims. I also question whether “humans and animals . . . are materially interdependent” (Benton, p. 17) by nature, or only because of human usage. Exceptions would be the dog-approaching-the-fire explanation of the origin of animal companion-keeping and the interchanges of energy taking place indirectly among all entities. Humans make themselves dependent on using animals, while the animals, “through millennia of selective breeding, combined with the destruction of their original natural habitat, . . . are rendered entirely dependent on human care and provisioning, which sets up moral obligations on the part of humans” (Benton, 2001a, p. 7). Because
these relationships are exploitative, duties of care within them seem subordinate to the need to abolish them? keeping only benign, voluntary, and autonomous associations. We do need animals emotionally (as distinct from materially), but the animals should have the choice of whether and how to respond.

More important, the relational background does not in itself confirm the “ought” of Marxism, which can apply only to each sentient individual within a relationship. Given Benton’s (1993) acceptance of Regan’s “claim that this responsibility may properly derive from considerations of harms and benefits to animals themselves, independently of the consequences . . . for the humans involved” (p. 210), arguments based on “relationship” rest on secondary matters of analysis and strategy rather than on the primary wrongness of human-caused animal suffering, as when Benton notes that accepting responsibilities arising from human-created dependency “would require quite deep-level transformations of human social and economic arrangements”. (p. 210)

Natural Comeuppance

We find a similar problem in “natural-comeuppance” arguments. Here, as regards human beings, the test is as follows: If it could not be successfully maintained that the bourgeoisie, with the active help of the working class, would ultimately dig their own graves, would Marx then regard the oppression of the workers as acceptable? On the other hand, were the theory proven right, would it be for that reason that the oppression of the workers was unacceptable? The moral reason, though coincident with the pragmatic one, stands on its own and derives from sympathy.

In the animal case, Benton (2001b, p. 10) gives a natural-comeuppance interpretation of the foot-and-mouth crisis: “Ironically, the local mobilizations against live animal transportation . . . in 1995 (often seen, even on the Left, as a marginal and ephemeral phenomenon) could not have been more germane. Had their welfare-inspired demands been met, the foot and mouth epidemic could not have taken the form it did.”

Even in the absence of ecological consequences, however, the wrong of factory farming and live exports—even in the absence of human-health consequences—would stand independently. So, unfortunately denied by Benton
(1993), would the wrong of slaughter for meat. The Marxist dimension of natural-comeuppance resides in the search for profit by agribusiness, but that has not determined the ethical factors.

**Sympathy**

Marxist theory combines with sympathy in the concept of surplus value with its moral aspect of unfair exchange and in the inherently moral concept of alienation, which combines utilitarian condemnation of suffering with “rights” notions of disrespect and violation of integrity.

A stronger link with sympathy lies in Benton’s (1993) appeal to the “socialist principle ‘to each according to need’” which “may . . . be properly read as a principle of distributive justice. . . . Though . . . the case for attributing rights to non-human animals faces severe intellectual obstacles, their ‘neediness’ as natural beings is a feature shared with human animals” (p. 212). True, “neediness” also can be applied unequally, and it is disappointing that Benton so applies it:

> In the face of continuing human/animal conflicts of need, grounds can be provided on either view of justice [“difference-respecting” or “perfectionist”] for meeting the needs of humans where they necessarily arise at the expense of the needs of other animals. (p. 215)

Benton (1993) also attacks vegetarianism on the ground that “[h]umans cannot live without causing the deaths of other animals which they either use directly as food, or whose habitats they appropriate or modify. . . . This is an ineradicable feature of the human predicament” (p. 210). But humans do not need meat; and in the face of natural limits to resources, we can exercise voluntary restraint so as to give animals a fair share.

Because of the possibility of such inegalitarian arguments and because neediness, like other facts, is not a moral imperative, it also does not completely link socialist principles with duties to animals. But it comes closest to such a linkage because of its subjective correlative, sympathy, which is the basis of socialist morality.

Any social theory is inconsistent if it withholds sympathy from animals, urges Noske, (1997): “To adopt a non-exploitative, inter-subjective attitude towards
one’s fellow human whilst continuing to approach animals as objects, is indefensible. Animal exploitation cannot be tolerated without damaging the principle of inter-subjectivity”. (p. 38)

Mills and Williams (1986) speak of “cruelty and suffering” and “barbarity” (p. 31); Klien (2000, p. 28), besides giving land-use or Third-World-hunger reasons for vegetarianism, cites the compassionate views of Tolstoy, Gandhi, Leonardo, and Shaw.

How Close is Marxism to Animal Rights?

As this sympathetic, prescriptive strand is essential to Marxism (for no one would care about the analysis if it did not affect anyone’s welfare) but also is held in common with non-Marxist worldviews, animal rights seems consistent but not coextensive with Marxism. Coextension would depend on the claim that Marxism offers the only way to realize social conditions in which to fulfill sympathy. One could then say that it was just as inconsistent to support animal rights, but not Marxism, as to support Marxism, but not animal rights. Even so, the Marxist analysis and practical program would have a subordinate, supportive role vis-a-vis the ethical principles. Without sympathy and other “animal values” such as freedom and integration with nature, Marxism also fails human beings. Its anti-sentient collectivism, power-ethic, and pro-industrialism have deprived aspirant socialist societies of the moral and environmental legitimacy that might have enabled them to withstand international capital’s attacks.

Progress Toward Inclusion

“[A] number of early animal rights advocates such as G. B. Shaw, Henry Salt and Edward Carpenter were socialists but they soon became disillusioned when the labour movement failed to show any significant interest” (Garner, 1993, p. 200). They would have been encouraged by later twentieth-century support, which gained momentum from a more receptive atmosphere within Marxism as well as in society as a whole. In the face of traditional hostility, Klien (2000) urged the U. S. Communist Party to “recognize the validity of [the vegetarian] movement and provide leadership” through “dialogue with environmental, vegetarian and animal rights organizations” (p. 28). The 2001 Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) manifesto contains a section on animal rights:
The SSP is committed to ending the cruelties systematically inflicted on millions of animals in the name of cheap food and free trade. The SSP will oppose

* Live animal exports.
* Foxhunting and other forms of hunting with hounds.
* The use of animal testing in cosmetic and military research.
* The unnecessary use of animal testing in medical research.

(p. 19)

Since then, the SSP paper *Scottish Socialist Voice* has carried an article headed “Why socialists should defend animal rights” (Patrick, 2001, p. 6).

**Conclusion**

Hall (1999) reminds us that according to Marx, “Everything in life is always in the process of growth and change” (p. 7). The writers considered here have contributed radically new ideas, all displaying concern for sentient beings from a socialist perspective. Marx sought to liberate the lowliest European humans. Modern Marxists, in a climate of more adventurous notions of “class,” are starting to recognize the animal as the lowest common denominator of suffering and, as such, the point at which alienation and exploitation begin. They recognize also that the anti-animal side of Marxism has made it less effective for human beings than it could have been. Only its pro-sentience, pro-individual strand—ethical but supported by pragmatism—offers hope of success, and that strand cannot be withheld consistently from animals. For these socialists, speciesism, like capital, “comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt” (Marx, 1970, p. 760).

Thus, the original opposites, the proletarian human and the animal, may be reconciled through the same concern whose extension to the former was enhanced earlier by its denial to the latter.

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